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Abstract
Since 2008, Spain’s economy has suffered from an unemployment crisis. In response, 
voters elevated the Partido Popular (PP) to power in 2011 after becoming frustrated with the 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español’s (PSOE) lack of effective action. However, since the elec-
tion of 2011, very little has changed in Spain’s stagnant economy. Unemployment remains 
high despite initially promising reforms in Spain’s labor market and a bailout for Spain’s 
larger banks in 2012 has done little to bring foreign investment back into the country. In 
this paper, I contend that the PP’s timid response to the unemployment crisis is the result of 
a conservative ideology among political elites. These elites are empowered to maintain these 
policies by a weak legislative representation system, rampant conflicts of interest between 
the government and financial institutions, and pressure by the international community to 
continue austerity measures without a temporary increase in public spending.
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Introduction
Since 2009, Spain has been spiraling into an economic abyss. Unemployment has 
rocketed to 26 % (Burgen, 2014), Spanish banks have failed to meet modest recapital-
ization and leverage-ratio goals (IMF Staff, 2013) and negotiations between Madrid and 
Brussels/Berlin over future deficit spending remain deadlocked. Protests erupted last year 
in March after Madrid adopted more austerity measures, resulting in violent clashes with 
police around Madrid and in Catalonia. Notwithstanding these alarming economic and 
political trends, Spanish leaders are like deer caught in the headlights; frozen at a time when 
effectual economic reforms are desperately needed. Amidst the worst economic crisis Spain 
has faced since the Great Depression, Prime Minister Rajoy’s wage reforms and negotiated 
bailouts have done little to change Spain’s course. Although more drastic policy changes 
may be ahead for Spain, this paper contends that Spain’s current policy outcomes have been 
determined by ideological forces that are protected by a weak system of checks of balances 
and international pressures based upon false premises. 
Specifically, this paper will argue four points. First, I will show that conservative ide-
ologies within the Partido Popular are the driving force for Spain’s current economic policies. 
Second, I will show that Spain’s party system shields top leaders from the immediate de-
mands of Spain’s population allowing the Spanish government to hold onto very unpopular 
positions. Third, I will briefly touch on how corruption may be reinforcing Spain’s insis-
tence that its banks remain in the hands of the private sector. Finally, I will argue that the 
EU’s calls for austerity measures in Spain have allowed the Partido Popular to divert respon-
sibility for its current crisis to the European Union, allowing the government to continue 
austerity measures despite wide spread protest among the Spanish population.
Party Ideology Provides A Stumbling Block
When the Partido Popular (PP) came to power in 2011, Prime Minister Rajoy was 
vague about what reforms he would choose to follow through with. Prior to the election, 
Mariano Rajoy’s party said little about the substance of its economic policies, instead relying 
on the ill-will felt towards the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) to propel the PP into 
office (The Economist, 2011). However, once in office President Rajoy closely followed 
the PP’s ideological values in his approach towards the recession and high unemployment 
in Spain. This section will outline the main values that the PP has historically stood for, and 
link these values to the current policy outcomes observed in Spain.
The Partido Popular is a mainstream conservative party similar to the United States’ 
Republican party on both social and economic issues. On social issues the PP advocates for 
strong families, anti-materialist morals, a strong national state that can preserve unity (Wiki-
pedia, 2014), and denied giving same sex couples marriage rights in 1996 (Gibbons, 1999). 
On the economy, the PP advocates for market friendly liberalism, greater flexibility in the 
job market, cuts in public expenditures, a decrease in high level office holders, private initia-
tive in entrepreneurship, and a restructuring of the social service delivery system (Gibbons, 
1999). In addition, the PP is vehemently opposed to government economic involvement, 
particularly nationalization and high rates of taxation linked to extensive governmental ser-
vices.
When the PP came to power in 2011, it followed the playbook it had been preaching 
for decades. In 2012, President Rajoy initiated ambitious labor market reforms intended to 
create greater flexibility in Spain’s job market (Pettis, 2013). After the PP pushed through 
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a particularly aggressive labor reform, President Rajoy said he expected to see protests in 
the streets. However, few Spanish citizens claim that reform is unnecessary; Spain’s current 
job market gives iron-clad work contracts to two-thirds of the work force while the other 
third of temporary workers are let go by companies skittish to hire anyone in such economic 
uncertainty (The Economist, 2012b). Initially, it seemed that the PP would be the party 
of action that Spain needed to revive itself. The OECD hailed President Rajoy’s reforms 
as good progress, but qualified the compliment by saying that more active measures aimed 
at lowering unemployment would be necessary (Pettis, 2013). So far, the Spanish govern-
ment’s efforts in that arena have been insignificant. According to the PP’s platform, inaction 
is the correct response. Theoretically, minimal governmental intervention combined with 
flexible job markets should allow the private sector to work out the unemployment problem 
on its own. Despite anemic growth, the PP has stuck to its guns; there have been no major 
increases in public spending since President Rajoy took office.
The Spanish government’s response to its banking crisis has been similarly influenced 
by the PP’s ideology. The PP has historically been opposed to government intervention in 
the economy, and reaffirmed that position again in 2012. Unlike Greece, which begged 
for a bailout from the ECB in 2010 (Weisenthal, 2010), Spain claimed that its banks were 
more well protected from the housing crisis fall-out of 2009, and refused to accept a bailout 
from the ECB in 2012 until President Rajoy received a promise that the money would be 
a loan with no strings attached. Spain’s economic minister even went so far as to claim that 
the 100 billion euro loan requested by Spanish banks, was “in no way … a rescue” (The 
Economist, 2012a). Though the PP may have been forced to bend on their ideals, their 
rhetoric on the financial sector regulation remains staunchly pro-market, with little govern-
ment interference.
Weak Institutions Create Compliance
Understanding the ideology of the PP is essential in explaining the Spanish govern-
ment’s current policies, but the institutions that created these policies have also played a 
critical role in preserving the Partido Popular’s unpopular positions. The Spanish executive 
branch is exceptionally strong and well protected relative to the Spanish legislature, allowing 
party leaders to create economic policies that are relatively unchallenged by the opposition 
or dissenters within their own party. Despite the reforms intended to change this system 
included in Spain’s current Constitution, the legislature has yet to gain an equal footing with 
the executive branch after decades of insignificance.
In the 1960’s and 70’s, the Spanish legislature’s check against the executive was over-
ridden by the Franco regime, and it became a de facto rubber stamp organization. Although 
the Spanish legislature (The Cortes) was given more power in the Post-Franco 1978 con-
stitution, the overarching behavior within the Cortes did not radically change; previous 
legislative reforms have only intensified negotiations among competing parties about what 
positions they will hold within the government. In his book, Spanish Politics Today, John 
Gibbons (1999) suggests that the current structure of the Spanish Parliament gives the elite 
members of the Cortes enormous financial power, especially when one party has an abso-
lute majority within parliament. Within the upper house (the Senate), and the lower house 
(the Congress of Deputies), members of parliament are divided into “parliamentary groups” 
that have a minimum of 15 members in Congress and 10 members in the Senate. Depu-
ties unable to form a coalition large enough to create a parliamentary group must become 
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members of the “Mixed Parliamentary Group”, which requires groups with potentially 
very different points of view to speak with one voice. Membership within a parliamentary 
group is linked to the reception of state subsidies, effectively mandating that deputies remain 
loyal to a parliamentary group once elected. Once a parliamentary group is formed, they are 
given a voice on the “Board of Spokespersons” that coordinates with the internally elected 
Presiding Councils to determine who will be appointed to what committees and how the 
agenda in the current legislative session will be set (p. 69). This structure effectively drowns 
out minority voices within the mixed parliamentary groups and squashes dissent within the 
ranks of larger parliamentary groups because deputies can be severely punished by party 
elites. In consequence, debate on controversial issues rarely becomes substantive in the Cor-
tes because parliamentary influence and re-election campaign funds are tightly tied to party 
loyalty. In addition, because the ruling party has direct influence over who may become the 
prime minister, there is little need for the Spanish Parliament to produce legislation inde-
pendent of the actions of the executive branch (p. 76).
The cumulative effect of this system is that the Spanish party elites have enough lever-
age to ignore the demands of newly elected officials representing troubled districts, contrib-
uting to the deafness of the Partido Popular in the wake of challenges that the unemployed 
face (Gibbons, 1999). However, even if the Cortes were a more robust organization, the 
office of Prime Minister is so well protected that regime change would be highly unlikely. 
President Rajoy can only be thrust out of office if an absolute majority in both houses of 
the Cortes rejects him, and there is an alternative candidate that can be agreed upon. These 
structural protections give the top echelons of Spanish officials enormous influence over 
their subordinates, and have set the stage for acts of corruption in that may be tying the 
hands of the PP in the midst of endemic unemployment (Gibbons, 1999). 
Corruption Suppresses Financial Reforms
In light of the immense protections Spanish politicians are given by Spanish laws, it is 
probable that corruption has reinforced the PP’s ideology. Party elites simply cannot afford 
large banking institutions to go belly up because bankrupt banks have their books thor-
oughly examined and made public. If this were to occur in some of Spain’s larger banks, 
many speculate that the books would reveal spectacular corruption within the highest levels 
of government. Corruption is a long standing problem in Spain, during the 1990’s Spain 
suffered from an astonishing run of corruption cases, touching so many of the political 
elite that many Spaniards felt that the entire system had become corrupt (Gibbons, 1999). 
Although the Partido Popular rode to power in 1996 on the promise of major corruption 
reforms, these reforms never materialized, and as a result members of the Spanish Cortes 
enjoy immunity from almost all types of prosecution while in public office (Newton & 
Donaghy, 1997) . While it is impossible to know what lies within the books of Spain’s 
largest banks, it has been shown that legislative immunity has allowed for an unusually cozy 
relationship to develop between smaller, community banks and the government. In 2012, 
The Guardian reported that Spain’s financial crisis had revealed a number of community 
banks that had been stuffed with board members that knew little to nothing about finance. 
These corrupt financial boards gave approval to all actions requested by banking executives, 
including massive executive pay raises, “soft loans” to family and friends of board members, 
and expensive vacations disguised as meetings (Tremlett, 2012). After the political fallout 
of those investigations, it should not be surprising that Spain’s largest political parties have 
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blocked an investigation into Bankia, one of Spain’s largest banks, after Bankia requested a 
19 billion euro bailout loan (Tremlett, 2012) . While this was an unpopular move, as long as 
party elites maintain control over the executive and legislative agenda of the government, 
evidence about current corruption will only come from autopsies performed on banks al-
lowed to fail. Thus, it is probable that the leaders of the PP have a major conflict of interest 
in preserving the health of Spain’s largest banks, leading to massive public debt transfers 
without adequate public oversight. 
International Pressures Reinforces the PP’s Economic Policies
While It is true that the PP’s austerity policies have been largely self-imposed by con-
servative leadership, it is also true that these measures have held much support from the 
international community. However, the reasoning of those interested in recommending 
austerity measures to Spain is fundamentally flawed, and has only been complimentary to 
President Rajoy’s own agenda while simultaneously providing the Spanish government a 
scapegoat for the negative consequences that Spaniards have suffered at the hands of their 
own government.
Beginning in 2000, Spain believed that it had achieved a sustainable growth rate of 
approximately 1 %. Compared with other Mediterranean EU members, Spain’s finances 
looked to be highly stable, with Spanish banks claiming to be more conservative than their 
Mediterranean counterparts until the collapse in 2008 (Trading Economics, 2013). How-
ever, after the crisis of 2008, Spain discovered that its 1 % growth had been the product of 
excessive liquidity that had allowed banks to accrue excessive debt within the housing sec-
tor (Munchau, 2012) . These debt problems were compounded by the market’s response to 
revelations implying that not all EU nations were equally sound investments. As the extent 
of the financial damage caused by the 2009 crisis became clear, Spain was cut-off from cheap 
credit as financial markets hedged against the risk of default. This panic became a self-ful-
filling prophecy; without access to the credit markets, Spain was unable to balance the debt 
on the banking sector’s books without foreign aid (Grauwe & Ji, 2012) . Thus, Spain’s fate 
rested heavily on the European Central Bank’s willingness to recapitalize its banking system. 
This gave Germany and the European Central Bank a tough decision. Spain’s banks 
were facing multi-billion dollar shortfalls that could threaten the entire EU banking system 
(Tremlett, 2012), but providing a bailout would be politically unpopular in both Germany 
and Spain. In Germany, a Spanish banking sector bailout appeared to reward the nation of 
Spain for excessive spending habits. In Spain, a bailout appeared to reward the banking sec-
tor after years of corrupt and destructive banking practices. This perception problem gave 
German politicians room to claim that Spain’s difficulties were a result of gluttony and fiscal 
recklessness, and pointedly claimed that if Spain were simply more like Germany, Spain 
would not be faced with so many fiscal challenges (Pettis, 2013). This narrative resonated 
well with the German population, but the facts are not aligned at all with this narrative. 
Prior to 2008, Spain possessed one of the smallest debt-GDP ratios of the entire EU (Blyth, 
2013). If Spain’s current unemployment problems were the result of excessive public ex-
penditures, then Spain’s debt ratio before the crisis of ’09 should show high spending in the 
public sector. However, between 2000 and 2008, Spain’s debt to GDP ratio lowered to 
below 40 %, one the lowest levels within the European Monetary Union. 
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Source: Trading Economics (2013a)
The difference between where Germans and Spaniards place the blame for Spain’s 
financial crisis become pivotal in 2010, when European nations were framing the debate 
about whether to recommend general austerity measures or focus on stricter financial regu-
lations. When Germans successfully placed the blame for Spain’s financial crisis on the na-
tion as a whole, recommending austerity measures became reasonable. However, for most 
of Spain’s newly unemployed workers, large-scale austerity measures have been perceived 
as immensely unjust, as managers of Spain’s financial institutions remain untouched by the 
suffering of most Spaniards.
 As shown in the above graph, German claims that excessive public debt ratios in Spain 
were the precursor to the financial fall-out of 2009 doesn’t hold up under investigation; it 
was not government debt that landed Spain in the worst financial straits it has experienced 
since the great depression. Nevertheless, Germany’s nationalistic rhetoric created an expec-
tation that Spain should begin issuing austerity measures before Spain’s 2012 bank bailout 
was even asked for. Like the Partido Popular, Germans have been recommending large cuts 
in public programs that would theoretically benefit Spain by increasing private sector spend-
ing. However, this position has not been made without opposition, some Spanish politicians 
claimed that cuts in public spending have deprived Spain of the two tools needed to pull the 
country out of recession: public sector employment and inflation (Evans-Pritchard, 2013).
These discussions have led some observers to wonder if Spain might leave the Europe-
an Monetary Union entirely. Several studies have indicated that a devaluing of the Spanish 
currency and an increase in the money supply could significantly reduce unemployment by 
compensating for Spain’s rising loan costs (Rosnick & Weisbrot, 2013) . However, should 
Spain leave the Euro, control of inflation would be placed back in the hands of the Presi-
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dent of Spain, who could decide to print the currency into an even worse condition while 
supporting popular domestic spending programs. In addition, in a personal interview with 
the author in 2013, Eckhard Wurzel, a Chief Economist at the OECD, argued that any cur-
rency backed by Spain would rapidly fall in value relative to the Euro because Spain would 
be unable to acquire the Euros necessary for repayment without resorting to hyperinflation. 
Because the conversion rate between the Euro and the new Spanish currency would be dif-
ficult for the Spanish government to control, issuing a new currency would deny Spain the 
ability to pay back the loans it has already received in Euros, effectively guaranteeing default 
(Wurzel, 2013). Finally, if Spain shifted currencies, it would be faced with an even higher 
interest rate in the bond market as rates compensated for Spain’s lack of EMU backing, 
leaving Spain without any sources of financing. Though the European Central Bank and 
Spain’s government balked before creating the debt-relief program necessary for Spain to 
cleanse itself of its toxic assets (Munchau, 2012), without the ECB’s support Spain’s bank-
ing sector could collapse, an unacceptable outcome that would destroy much of the EU’s 
banking system. 
What is fascinating about these pressures is that the demands of the EU upon the 
Spanish government align with the ideological position of Spain’s current ruling party, 
which makes the “resistance” against the EU’s austerity measures an elaborate double game 
intended to shift some of the blame for Spain’s austerity policies from President Rajoy to 
Chancellor Merkel and the EU central bank (The Economist, 2012a). In a shrewd applica-
tion of diversionary theory, the Partido Popular has managed to shift the narrative of austerity 
away from Socialists vs. Conservatives, and instead create an “Us vs. Them” argument that 
has bought the Partido Popular more maneuvering room. Prime Minister Rajoy is treading 
a thin line though; if his tactic backfires, the Partido Popular could lose power to a more 
extreme political party willing to pull Spain out of the European Monetary Union to put 
more Spaniards back to work in the short run.
Conclusion
Spain’s economy has devolved from a stable growth area into a nation trapped with 
high unemployment and little to no economic growth. Although Spain is a functional 
democracy, the structure of the executive and legislative branches has enabled the Partido 
Popular party elites to continue pursuing austerity measures in spite of little improvement 
in Spain’s economy. This will continue until a significant change takes place. If an eco-
nomically liberal regime takes power, it is possible that Madrid could seek to stimulate the 
economy through the expansion of government programs in order to appease the popula-
tion. However, if more radical anti-establishment parties continue to gain power, a new EU 
skeptic coalition could choose to reassert the authority of the government’s authority over 
its monetary policy by leaving the EMU altogether. The recent May 25th European Parlia-
ment elections indicate that Spain’s mainstream parties, the PP and the PSOE, have both 
lost significant ground to smaller Euro skeptic parties like the Podemos and The United Left 
(Wikipedia, 2014a). Regardless of whether Euro skeptic parties are able to create a majority 
in parliament, if the general elections follow this same pattern Spain’s new governing coali-
tion will be placed under much more pressure to distance itself from the EU and initiate 
policy changes that would contradict Brussels’ and the PP’s current austerity policies. 
Another possible avenue of change could be further reforms allowing representatives 
in the Cortes to become more involved in the policy making process. A strong legislative 
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branch would make the pain of high unemployment felt more keenly by party leaders in the 
executive, thus prompting more timely action aimed at relieving the burden of unemploy-
ment. There are several ways this could be accomplished: one way would be to allow the 
Cortes oversight over the selection of a Prime Minister’s cabinet members, and a mechanism 
of applying pressure on individual cabinet members. Another possibility could be the dis-
solution of the forced grouping system that isolates incoming congressional deputies from 
other coalitions and diminishes the power of smaller parties by grouping them into “mixed 
parties”. Either way, as long as the executive government continues to enjoy the enough 
power to carry out ideologically driven policies, those policies may not be in the best inter-
ests of Spain’s working population.
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